Capital markets and interest rates in 1970 by anonymous
HE MOST SPECTACULAR fluctuations in mar-
ketable securities prices in the era since World War II
have been encountered since early 1970. The markets
for both common stocks and bonds staged large raffles
between June 1970 and February 1971, after declin-
ing in the spring of last year. At their zenith in June,
high-grade bond yields reached levels never before
recorded in U. S. financial annals. Stock prices
slumped to six-year lows in May. Capital market pes-
simisin reached great extremes; some (though not all)
observers foresaw a dearth of funds available for in-
vestment extending far into the decade. Lower inter-
est rates and higher stock prices have doubtless
caused revision of such views, although the pace of
the market changes makes reappraisal of long-run
financing prospects difficult, Beyond that, the 1970
experience raises questions about the causes of such
gyrations and their effects on the economy.
Cyclical Variations in
Interest Rates and Stock Prices
Among the unusual features of financial markets in
1970 was the delayed response of long-term interest
rates to the business downturn. Whereas in previous
postwar business slowdowns, peaks in bond yields oc-
curred promptly after business peaks or even pre-
ceded them, three quarters elapsed after the business
downturn in 1969 before long-term Treasury and cor-
porate bond yields reached their peaks. Since then,
the reductions in yields have been the greatest in
amount of any comparable period since World War
II. Seasoned corporate Aaa bonds, for example, de-
clined from a peak of 8.6 per cent in the week ending
June 26, 1970 to 7.1 per cent in the week ending
March 5, 1971. Long-term U. S. government securities
fell from a yield of 6.8 per cent to 5.9 per cent in the
same span of time. In a recent reversal, yields, es-
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pecially on corporate new issues, have risen and other
long-term interest rates have stopped declining.
Short-term interest rates displayed more typical
cyclical behavior, reaching highs at the beginning of
1970, a quarter after the downturn in business activity,
then falling rapidly with only one temporary reversal
throughout the year. The four- to six-month commer-
cial paper rate, which was 9.08 per cent in the second
week of January 1970, plummeted to 4.25 per cent
by early March 1971, Three-month U. S. Treasury bill
yields fell from 7.91 per cent to 3.35 per cent in the
same period.
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Stock prices underwent a broad retreat throughout
1969 and early 1970. In Spring 1970, retreat threat-
ened to turn into rout for a brief interval, as stock
prices fell by 23 per cent between April 1. and May
26. By the end of May, however, the market began
to regain composure. and since then, stock prices
have rebounded. i’he Standard and Poor’s Index of
500 Stocks (1941-43 = 10), which reached a low of
69.29 on May 26, 1970, climbed to 97.56 by early
March 1971.
Term Structure of Interest Rates
The accompanying chart depicts three “yield
curves” (relationships betwecn maturities of fixed in-
terest-bearing obligations and their market yields)
for U. S. obligations with maturities running from less
than one year out to thirty years. The curves were
observed at three different dates: January 2, 1970,
May 28, 1970, and February 19, 1971. They are based
on actual yields on these dates, hut each curve has
been smoothed to fill in gaps in maturity where no
actual obligations are available.
In general, when interest rates undergo a rapid
downward readjustment, as in the past fourteen
months. both their average level and the term struc-
ture of interest rates are affected. It is typical for
short—tenn rates to fall much more rapidly than long—
term yields. For example, rates on U. S. Government
ohligations maturing in less than one year, which
entered 1970 one percentage point above twenty—year
U. 5. bonds, were more than two percentage points
below long-term bond yields by February 19, 1971.
This is consistent with the assumption that the long—
term bond yield is an average of a sequence of ex-
pected short-term yields. A decline in current short-
term market rates would generally have only a small
immediate effect in changing this long-term average.
As mentioned previously, short-term rates peaked
several months before long-term rates. If the bond
market had anticipated the general decline in inter-
est rates, the decline should have been reflected ini-
tially (although mildly) in medium—term or longer-
term interest rates. A related development was the
whiplash action of the yield curve between January
2, 1970 and May 28, 1970 when yields fell in the
shortest niaturity ranges. while rising in the medium-
and long—maturity segments. Usually, all segments of
the yield curve move in the same direction simultane-
ous1),, \\‘ith the short-term end moving more than the
long-term end. TIns pattern did indeed quickly reas-
sert itself by July 1970.
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Inflation Expectations and Intercst Rates
The expectations interpretation of the yield curve
helps explain how some of the recent change in in-
terest rates was transmitted through the maturity
spectrum. Other considerations would explain how the
general level of interest mates is dctcnnined, A factor
which may have contributed greatly to the high levels
of interest rates up to the 1970 peaks is anticipated
inflation. Interest rates on mien’ loans were adjusted
upward to reflect the expected depreciation of the
purchasing power of the dollar during the period of
each loan. Since borrowers expect to repay loans in
depreciated dollars, they were willing to offer higher
interest rates. Lenders, on the other hand, were will-
ing to accept such terms only because high interest
rates include an inflation premium that compensates
for the expected reduction in the value of the dollar.
In other words, what borro\vers and lenders agree
upon is a nominal or market interest rate (Rn) which,
when the premium for the expected percentage rate
of inflation ( AP”) is subtracted, leaves a net interest
rate (Rr) that represents both an acceptable rate of
return to the lender and cost to the borrower. This
net return, after allowing for anticipated inflation, is
what some economists have labelled the “real” rate of
interest.t That is, the real rate, Rr, equals Rn — AP°,
This interpretation of interest rate movements has
been incorporated in the interest rate equations of
the St. Louis model.2 It has also beet) employed in a
related study of stock price determination.tm These
studies find that other factors influence real rates of
interest, notably gro\vth in the money stock (currency
plus demand deposits) which exercises a short-lived
negative effect (positive on stock prices), and growth
in real output, \vhich affects the real rate of interest
positively with a lag over a longer time span (nega-
tive effect on stock prices). Corporate after-tax profits
also have a positive impact, with a lag, on stock prices.
Anticipated inflation, in the sense already described,
has a powerful influence ii) these equations, tending
to drive average stock prices down and interest rates
up.’
~ Intucst Rates and Price 1 evd Clmangs 1952 69 this
Review (flecemher 1969), pp. 1&38.
2”A Monetanst Model for Economic Stabilization,” this Review
(April 1970), PP. 7-25.
‘Fxpeetations, Money and the Stock Market,” this Review
(lanuary 1971), pp. 16-31.
-‘‘l’he effect of anticipated inflation on stock prices runs
counter to some interpretations of stocks as ‘hedges’’ against
inflation. The findings suggest that expected corporate earn~
ings do not fully adjust to anticipated price advances. In-
vestors apparently regard common stocks typically as mixtures
Most of the rise in bond yields from 1965 until
early 1970 can he attributed to the escalation in the
inflation premium. It appears, however, that inflation
anticipations based on past price experience) cannot
fully account for the high levels of interest rates (and
low levels of stock prices) in the second and third
quarters of 1970. Correspondingly, in the first quarter
of 1971, the interest rate equations forecast only a
mild decline in rates, by companson with the declines
which have already occurred, Stock price forecasts
are helow the current market average, although the
direction of change is being correctly predicted.
Either inflation fears are now subsiding more rapidly
than these equations recognize, or some other factors
are at work pulling interest rates down.
Other Possible Explanations for Recent
Interest Rate and Stock Price Movements
Apart from anticipated inflation, other factors might
have exercised an influence on nominal interest rates
by altering the real rate of interest. Such factors in-
clude special disturbances affecting either the supply
of money relative to the demand for money, or the
flow of intended saving relative to intended invest-
ment, In adtlition, there might have been sudden or
unusual shifts among sectors in their borrowing or
lending patterns, causing temporary adjustment prob-
lems that could have been reflected in interest rates.
Recent developments wiH be surveyed from each of
these points of view.
Factors Affecting Demand for and
Supply of Money and Near Monies
Rapid growth in monetary aggregates relative to
growth ii) demand for them should exert downward
pressure on interest rates — in the short run. The op-
posite short-run effect on rates occurs when the sup-
ply of monetary aggregates is growing less rapidly
than their demand.
Monetary rates of change, both including and ex-
cluding net time deposits, reached lows hi the latter
half of 1969, and thereafter reversed the downtrends
that began in 1968.~Business activity began to recede
ii) the third or fourth quarter of 1969. This represents
of fixed nominal income streams, like bonds, and earnings
streams that escalate with inflation. For this reason, the
average price of all common stocks cannot be viewed simply
as the market valuation of real capital.
5
Net timne deposits are total time deposits less large denomnina—
tion CD’s. A similar statement could be made describing
tIme mate of growth in money plus total time deposits, or even
broader liquidity aggregates including savings arid loan
shares and mutual savings bank deposits.
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a relatively earls’ turnaround in comparison with
monetary rates of change near previous postwar busi-
ness cycle peaks’ Frequently the lowest rates of
monetary growth have come several months after the
business peak. Hemmee, the continued high level of
interest rates in earl)? 1970 cannot he attributed to
sluggish increases in the monetary aggregates in the
face of the business slowdown.
During the last half of 1970, when interest rates fell
sharply, the large increase in negotiable CD’s was
C( nt nd r its of dhanl,e of nmo\ mng avenges gi’ e somewhit
difl erent results than ‘‘step” rates of change. Both are shown
in chart above, The “step” method is generally used in this
Bank’s reports. Changes in “steps” tendl to be preceded by
peaks and troughs in centered moving average rates of
change.
a prominent feature of growth in monetary aggre-
gates. Negotiable CD’s grew from $13.2 billion in
June 1970 to $27 billion in February 1971. Money
supply plus all commercial hank time deposits in-
creased at a 17.4 per cent annual rate in the same
period. Upward interest adjustments on CD’s (follow-
ing suspension in June of Regulation Q interest ceil-
ings on large CD’s of less than 90 days maturity),
combined with a declining trend of interest rates on
competitive assets such as commercial paper, Euro-
dollars, and Treasury’ bills. made CD’s more attractive
for bsisinesses to hold.
There has also been a very substantial increase in
net time deposits at commercial banks and savings
institutions. Between June 1970 and February 1971,
these liquid assets grew by $43.1 billion. Over the
same tune span, money supply, defined as currency
plus demand deposits, rose at a 5.7 per cent annual
rate. In comparison with the turnarounds in previous
periods of monetary expansion, the increased growth
in the money stock relative to its low point in 1969
has been moderate, but the recovery in growth of
money stock plus net time deposits has been rapid.
Some of this growth can he ascribed to “reintermne-
diation” which occurs when interest rates decline on
competing liquid assets. In addition, the decline in
these interest rates, especially in recent months, has
received a significant stimulus from expansionary
monetary policy. For example, reserves of member
banks have increased at an annual rate of 14.3 per
cent since fast June. The recent high rates of growth
in the broader aggregate of money plus net time de-
posits reflect both the rapid expansion in bank re-
serves and the sharp decline in interest rates on
marketable securities,
A useful, though crude, measure of the demand for
money balances in relation to income is the “income
velocity of money” — the ratio of income to money
balances. This ratio isan indicator of the turnover
rate of money balances in exchange for goods and
services. The following chart shows the ratio of
CNP to mone plus “net time deposits” (corn—
mnercial bank time deposits excluding large dlenomi—
nation CD’s) in postwar business recessions. The
amount of mnomiey balances demanded increases either
more or less than proportionately with income or GNP.
During much of the postwar period, the chart shows
velocity to have risen with each successive business
cycle. indicating a tendency for holders of nmoney amid
net time deposits to increase their spending on goods
and services faster than the groivth in their liquid
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balances.7 Hosvever, during business slowdo~vns,velo-
city falls — monetary assets increase relative to GNP.
This happened in each of the recessions of 1949, 1954,
1958, and 1961, and in 1970.
The decline in velocity during business slowdowns
is typically associated with reductions in interd’st
rates.8 After the business trough is reached, interest
rates rise and velocity tendls to recover. If the contra-
cyclical rise in long-term interest rates in early 1970
had been the result of a sudden rise in the demnandl
for niommey plus net time deposits, we should he able
to detect it in an abnormally sharp drop in velocity.9
Similarly, the rapid decline in interest rates would he
associated with an abnormally’ sharp rise in velocity
— signifying a reduction in the dlemandl for money
plus mmet time tleposits. The dleerease in velocity dur-
7
The rise imi velocity of money stock as conventionally deflnedl
has been greater than the rise in the velocity of money plus
“net time deposits, especially in the last decade.
“Time rise in velocity between successive post World \Var II
business cycles is associated with (and may, in part, he dsie
to) successive higher levels of interest rates.




ing the 1970 business contraction was not unusual by
comparison with postwar recessions. Nor has there
been any evidence of an unusually sharp rise in veloc-
ity in recent months. Except for possibly the fourth
quarter, one may rule out sudden changes in the
demand for money plus net time deposits as a con-
tributing factor to the abnormal behavior of interest
rates since January 1970.10
The velocity of mnoney plus net timne deposits is
perhaps too broad a measure, especially since it tends
to consist very largely of liquid assets held by house-
holds, which exhibited none of the symptoms of a
liquidity crisis in 1970. Some observers found such
symptoms among business finns reacting to unfavor-
able financial developments in 1970. The failure of
Penn Central Company sent liabilities of business fall-
ures upward in midyear. Corporate profits sagged for
four quarters in a row beginning with third quarter
1969. Liquidity positions of nonfinancial corporations,
by a variety of yardsticks, were stretched thinner in
mid-1970 than in any previous postxvar year. There
is little evidence, however, that in 1970 a significant
number of othenvise financially viable finns were
forced to close for liquidity reasons alone.
Velocity of nonfinancial corporate cash balances
tends to decline during business contractions. The
1970 decline was delayed until three quarters after
the fourth quarter 1969 turning point in business ac-
tivity. but it is not clear whether this was a cause or a
result of high interest rates. To he a cause of high
interest rates, one must assume the rise in corporate
velocity after the business peak was unintended, so
that corporations were attempting to improve their
liquidity positions. Much of what appears to be a
decline during 1969 and early 1970 in corporate liq-
uidity (rise in velocity) merely represents switching
from negotiable CD’s to commercial paper and gov-
ernment securities. Such shifts wert’ a result of high
interest rates (and regulatory interest ceilings on
CD’s ) , not a cause of high interest rates.
I “The General Motors strike of September—November, 1970
nay have temporarily depressed the amnoumst of money de—
nmancled in the fourth dimmarter of 1970 by reducing output
and income below what it wouldl have othenvise been,
This m’esponse would not l,e fully reflected in velocity, if
both income and demand for money declined and money
stock were also reduced ‘Sr pernntted to grow less rapidly.
lntem’est rates, therefore, eotsld have been forced downward
in the fourth quarter because of the eli ect of the strike, In
the three months since the strike ‘yam settled, output growth
has recovered from its strike-induced low, but interest rates
have continued to fall. Other factors are evidently at work
in redsrcing interest rates currently.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS MARCH 1971
Saving and Investment in
a Business Slowdown
An excess of intended saving over intended invest-
ment tends to reduce interest rates, and conversely.
There are practical difficulties, of course, in distin-
guishing intended from actual saving and investment.
One technique for attempting this involves a decom-
position of saving by sector and investment by cate-
gory of expenditure, within the national income
accounting framework. Saving is composed of three
volatile components — personal saving, corporate
undistributed profits (adjusted to remove inventory
revaluation), and the net surplus of Federal and
state and local governments. Jnvestment consists of
residential construction plus business expenditures on
durable equipment, and structures, and inventory ac-
cumulation, shown in the accompanying chart.
Personal saving, measured in the national income
accounts as disposable income minus consumption
expenditures, excludes accumulation of consumer dur-
ables. It represents mainly liquid asset accumulation,
net of additions to consumer debt. During the cur-
rent business slump, this category of saving grew as a
percentage of personal disposable income from 5.3
per cent in the second quarter of 1969 to a peak of
7.6 per cent in the third quarter of 1970, and declined
slightly to 7.3 per cent in the fourth quarter. Taken
by itself, the rise in personal saving has exerted a
downward influence on interest rates since 1969.
In previous postwar recessions, the personal saving
rate has shown no clear cyclical pattern; it has some-
times risen, sometimes declined. The cyclical varia-
tion in measured personal income around its expected
grosvth path does not seem to exercise a substantial
influence on the saving rate. Part of its behavior may
reflect monetary ‘growth itself, since high rates of
liquid saving relative to income are likely to take the
form of rapid accumulation of cash balances. A rise
in price levels will reduce the purchasing power of
liquid assets and might induce households to attempt
to restore that purchasing power by increased liquid
More recently, the velocity of corporate cash bal-
ances has declined, partly because of the reversal of
previous movements out of CD’s. Even so, corporate
liquidity is not at present exceptionally high, nor has
it improved rapidly by comparison with experience
in previous business slowdowns. Hence, current down-
ward pressures on interest rates do not appear to have
their origin in greater liquidity of corporations.
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saving. Sustained inflation, on the other hand, builds
up anticipation of future price advances, which tends
to discourage liquid saving. Higher interest rates on
liquidl assets, however, could compensate for antici-
pated inflation, and may have dlone so to somnc extent
in recent years.
The rise in the personal saving rate that began in
the third quarter of 1969 appears to coincide with
more rapid monetary growth. Looking ahead, a sub-
stantial decline in personal saving rates could occur
as a result of lo~verinterest rates, slower monetary’
growth or reduced inflation, especially if anticipated
inflation remnams high.
Investment in dwellings is generally regarded as
highly responsive to interest rate movements, rather
than as a factor operating to exert strong pressure on
interest rates, especially pressure of a procyclical na-
ture. High and rising mnortgage interest costs in 1969
and early 1970 were reflected in declining residential
construction expenditures. Federal government sup-
port of housing programs may have moderated the
decline. Since the second quarter, homebuilding ex-
penditures have rebounded to an annual rate of $32
billion, less than $2 billion below their 1969 peak.
Prospects for a continuation of this resurgence have
been bolstered by the recent declines in long-term
interest rates. These have enabled the Federal gov-
ernment to reduce EllA and VA ceiling mortgage
loan rates to 7 per cent from the 8½ per cent level of
December 1969.
Capital expenditure plans in the business sector
svere exceedingly bullish in the early stages of the
economic sloxvdown. Initial anticipations called for
plant and equipment outlays in 1970 to increase by
snore than 10 per cent over the previous year. Actual
1970 business capital spending was only 8.6 per cent
gi-eater than in 1969. As the chart (p. 7) shows, busi-
ness spending on equipment arid nonresidential struc-
tures turned down after the thirdl quarter of 1970.
Nevertheless, the early plant and equipnnent surveys
for 1970 mirrored the upward thrust of fixed invest-
ment intentions at the outset of the 1969-70 slowdown,
Coupled with declining profits, which reduced the
ability of corporations to finance capital spending
through retained earnings, the net pressure on inter-
est rates of the corporate sector’s intended saving
and fixed investment \vas undoubtedly upward in
early 1970.11 Capital spending plans were revised
~‘A $9.7 billion decline in inventory accumulation from the
third quarter (Sf 1969 to the first quarter of 1970 helped
ofiset this pressure. In the second quarter, inventor)’ change
reven’sed direction, and by the fourth quarter was increas-
ing at a $3.6 billion annual rate,
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downsvard later in the year and corporate profits im-
proved1, so that tIns pressure on interest rates was
eased.’2 In the latest survey conducted by the De-
partment of Commerce and SEC in Jamiuary andl
February, business planned to increase its 1971 spend-
ing on plant and equipment by 4.3 per cent over the
1970 level.
An important sector affecting capital markets
through flows of expendlitures relative to receipts is
the Fedleral Government. The Federal budget, on a
national income accounts (NIA) basis, moved from
a surplus at a $13.4 billion annual rate in the second
quarter of 1969 to a $14.2 billion rate of deficit in the
second quarter of 1970. An increase in the Federal
net deficit usually occurs during business slowdoxvns
due to reduced growth in tax revenues relative to
expenditures. Expiration of the surtax, retroactive
Federal pay increases, and increased social security
benefits also contributed to the decrease in the net
surplus in early 1970.
The strong swing by the Federal Government from
a net “saver to a net “tlissaver” position, primarily
between the fourth quarter of 1969 and the second
quarter of 1970, coincides with the abnormally long
lag in response of bond yields to a downturn in
business activity. A continuing large government defi-
cit may not elevate interest rates, hut a rapid increase
in the deficit, or decrease in the surplus, may exert
temporary upward pressure on interest rates. The de-
clinic in long-tenn interest rates since mnidyear mnay
therefore represent a return to their typical cyclical
response as the Federal deficit passed its period of
mnost rapid increase.’-5
The Federal deficit (national income accounts
basis) increased somewhat in the fourth quarter of
12
1t is conceivable that some or even most of tile strength in
early capital expenditure plans for 1970 reflected inflation
anticipations. Expected productivity of additional plant and
equipment might even have declined throughout 1970. Low
arid falling levels of capacity utilization suggest that the
marginal productivity of ne’v facilities may be decreasing;
so also does the deceleration of growth in total real output
in the economy, which began in early 1968. It can be
argued that the rate of growth in total output is an appmoxi-
mnation to the expected return on physical inveshnent.
hi’The inimnediate impact of a sharp rise in the government
deficit need not be concentrated in the maturity ranges in
which new government debt is being issued. The effects
might register nnost heavily in another sector, if simultane-
ously with heavy govermuent borrowing in one maturity
region, tile private sector is retiring debt in that range and
increasing its borrowing ins some other maturity region. As
discussed below, in 1970 corporations were retiring their
short-term debt while increasing their long-term debt. At
the same time the Federal government was borrowing
heavily in the short-term end of the maturity range.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS MARCH 1971
1970 to an estimated $15.3 bilhon annual rate. From
this point, the NIA deficit is likely to decrease gradu-
ally as the economic recovery picks up momentum.
The Administration projects a $15 billion NIA deficit
in fiscal 1971, which would imply deficits averaging
more than a $13 billion annual rate in the first two
quarters in 1971. In fiscal 1972, which begins July 1,
1971, the NIA deficit is projected to decline to a $4.2
billion annual rate. Taking the national income ac-
counts budget as an indicator, and assuming the ac-
curacy of the Administration’s projections, the Federal
sectors’ upward pressure on interest rates svould seem
to be easing.”
Disturbances in the Capital Markets
Sudden changes in asset and liability positions in
various sectors, especially xvhen they are related to
alterations in the maturity structure of outstanding
credit obligations, sometimes provide clues about the
net direction of pressures on interest rates. It is not
always easy to distinguish between autonomous and
accommodating financial transactions, but when the
changes are of extremely large magnitude, as some
were in 1970, there may be less difficulty in discern-
ing the sources of disturbances in credit markets,
Two features of 1970 capital markets are deserving
of special mention. The first is the exceptionally sharp
increase in long-term borrowing by nonfinancial cor-
porations. Much of this reflected refinancing of short-
run debt (bank loans primarily) carried over from
1969 and earlier, and did not represent a marked
change in the rate of growth in total corporate debt.
Lengthening of the maturity of corporate debt in
1970 may have eased the pressure of net government
borrowing in short-term credit markets, while adding
to weakness in long-term credit markets early in the
year.
The dollar volnme of new corporate securities is-
sued (gross proceeds) continued at an unslackened
rate throughout 1970, totaling more than $38 billion,
only $8.6 billion of which were new stock issues, New
issues in the first txvo months of 1971 were in excess
of the corresponding months of 1970, and there are
as yet no definite signs of a letup in long-term financ-
ing demands. The calendar of new corporate issues
for March is extremely heavy. Since corporations have
been reducing their short-term borrowing, particularly
from banks, while adding to their short-tenn assets,
~For an evaluation of the Administration’s fiscal 1972 budget
and 1971 economic plan, see “The 1971 National Economic
Plan” in this Review, pp. 11-19.
especially CD’s, it is evident that many corporations
are striving to strengthen their liquidity positions.
The second notable feature was the extremely large
rise in commercial banks’ net lending, particularly in
the third quarter. A major portion of this, of course,
arose out of the retirement of commercial paper by
banks’ parent holding companies and its replacement
by CD’s. Bank credit expansion was $25.8 billion
greater (annual rate) in the Summer quarter than in
the Spring, after allowing for this. Almost $15.2 billion
of this increase in bank credit was accounted for by
loans to security dealers and brokers to finance ac-
quisition of U. S. Government and other securities.
An increase in the rate of acquisition by banks of
U. S. Government securities accounted for another
$8.2 bilhon (annual rate) of the bank credit increase.
Commercial bank lending to business slowed in the
third quarter and declined in the fourth. In the fourth
quarter, banks became heavy net purchasers of muni-
cipal and Federal agency securities.
Long-term bond yields, which had generally de-
clined in January, February, and March 1970, con-
forming to their cyclical pattern, rose again in April,
May, and June. It appears that the sharp declines in
the Spring, and the subsequent Summer rallies in
bond and stock mnarkets, gained strength from a mas-
sive shift in investment policy amnong securities deal-
ers and brokers, from net liquidation of their positions
in the second quarter to aggressive rebuilding in the
third quarter. The reasons for this behavior may be
traceable to special circumstances — the Cambodian
incursion, the campus riots, and a series of failures,
forced mergers and recapitalizations among broker-
age firms, These events took their toll on the stock
and bond markets in the Spring. Then the failure of
Penn Central sent tremors through the bond and
connmercial paper markets in June. After the severe
buffeting subsided, securities dealers regained confi-
dence, The much discussed liquidity crisis of the
Spring and early Summer of 1970 centered very
largely in the fortunes of brokerage firms. It may
account for a large part of the unusual cyclical re-
sponse of bond yields. The effect on interest rates
and stock prices, while possibly significant at that
time, was short-lived.
Summary and Conclusions
Interest rates, particularly bond yields, remained
near peak levels for an abnormally lengthy period
in 1970 after the downturn in bnmsiness activity. Sev-
eral factors could have contributed to this long lag in
response. These include (1) the persistence of inrfla-
Page 9FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS MARCH 1971
tionarv anticipations; (2) the sharp rise in the Federal
deficit during fiscal 1970; (3) heavy long—term borrow-
ing by corporations, coupled with exuberant capital
expenditure programs early in the year; (4) the very
gradual decline in real output growth, compared svith
previonns postwar recessions; (5) the financial prob-
lems of securities dlealers, which were reflected in net
liquidations of their securities inventory positions in
thd’ Spring; and (6) special circumstances, such as
the Cambodian incursion amidl campus rioting. The
Penn Central crisis temporarily lifted interest rates in
June.
After the mid—year turnaround in bond yields, all
interest rates except yields on lower grade bonds went
into a decline, which accelerated in the fourth quar-
ter. In part, the fall in rates represented a return to
their typical behavior during cyclical downswings in
economic activity. The drop in long-term and short-
term rates continued, however, in the first txvo months
of 1971, following the low point of the business slow-
down that was reached in the fourth quarter of 1969.
In February, three-month Treasury bills yielded less
than 4 per cent for the first time since 1967, and Aaa
corporate bonds yielded less than 7 per cent for the
first time since 1968.
Inasmuch as the high interest rates of tile last few
years may well have been largely a reflection of infla-
tion anticipations, it is possible that we are now wit-
nessing a dramatic dlc’-csealation of these anticipations.
A broader interpretation accepts such dc-escalation as
part of the story. It would, however, emphasize other
forces exerting dlownwardi pressure on interest rates
and upward pressure on common stock prices in re-
cent months. These include (1) an improved financial
outlook among securities firnns; (2) the automobile
so-ike in the fourth qnmarter; and (3) reduced business
optimism regarding rates of return on physical invest-
ment (reflected in conservative 1971 plant and equip-
ment spending plamis andl sluggish short—term business
borrowing). An expansive nnonetary policy, especially
as displayed in the broader monetary aggregates, also
may have played a major role in the recent bond and
stock market rallies.
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